Abstract
Is the Environment a Human Rights Issue?
Why should environmental protection be treated as a human rights issue? There are several possible answers. Most obviously, and in contrast to the rest of international environmental law, a human rights perspective directly addresses environmental impacts on the life, health, private life, and property of individual humans rather than on other states or the environment in general. It may serve to secure higher standards of environmental quality, based on the obligation of states to take measures to control pollution affecting health and private life. Above all it helps to promote the rule of law in this context: governments become directly accountable for their failure to regu late and control environmental nuisances, including those caused by corporations, and for facilitating access to justice and enforcing environmental laws and judicial 616 EJIL 23 (2012), hindsight it can be seen that this early work was premature and overly ambitious, and it made no headway in the UN. However, the relationship between human rights and environmental protection in international law is far from simple or straightforward. The topic is challenging for the agenda of human rights institutions, and for UNEP, partly because it straddles two competing bureaucratic hegemonies, but it also poses some difficult questions about basic principles of human rights law. We will explore these in later sections of this article.
The merits of any proposal for a declaration or protocol on this subject thus depend on how far it deals with fundamental problems or merely window dresses what we already know. There is little to be said in favour of simply codifying the application of the rights to life, private life and property in an environmental context. Making explicit in a declaration or protocol the greening of existing human rights that has already taken place would add nothing and clarify little. As Lauterpacht noted in 1949, ' [c]odification which constitutes a record of the past rather than a creative use of the existing materials -legal and others -for the purpose of regulating the life of the community is a brake upon progress'. 17 If useful codification necessarily contains significant elements of progressive development and law reform, the real question is how far it is politic or prudent to go. 18 The question therefore is not whether a declara tion or protocol on human rights and the environment should deal with existing civil and political rights, but how much more it should add. What can it say that is new or that develops the existing corpus of human rights law? There are three obvious possibilities.
First, procedural rights are the most important environmental addition to human rights law since the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. Any attempt to codify the law on human rights and the environment would necessarily have to take this development into account. Doing so would build on existing law, would endorse the value of procedural rights in an environmental context, and would clarify their precise content at a global level. In section 3 we consider whether it could also go further by developing a public interest model of accountability, more appropri ate to the environmental context, and drawing in this respect on the 1998 Aarhus Convention.
Secondly, a declaration or protocol could be an appropriate mechanism for articu lating in some form the still controversial notion of a right to a decent environment. Such a right would recognize the link between a satisfactory environment and the achievement of other civil, political, economic, and social rights. It would make more explicit the relationship between the environment, human rights, and sustainable development and address the conservation and sustainable use of nature and natural resources. Most importantly, it would offer some means of balancing environmental objectives against economic development. In section 4 we consider including such a right within the corpus of economic, social, and cultural rights.
Thirdly, in section 5 we consider the difficult issue of the extraterritorial applica tion of existing human rights treaties. This is relevant to transboundary pollution and global environmental problems, such as climate change, because if human rights law does not have extraterritorial scope in environmental cases then we cannot easily use it to help protect the global environment. Even if we cross this hurdle, however, the problems remain considerable.
Environmental Rights and the UN Human Rights Institutions
Unlike human rights courts, it has not been clear until now how far the UN human rights community takes environmental issues seriously. There is no doubt that the UN institutions realize that civil, political, economic, and social rights have environ mental implications that could help to guarantee some of the indispensable attributes of a decent environment. A 2009 report for the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) emphasizes the key point that ' [w]hile the universal human rights treaties do not refer to a specific right to a safe and healthy environment, the United Nations human rights treaty bodies all recognize the intrinsic link between the environment and the realization of a range of human rights, such as the right to life, to health, to food, to water, and to housing'. 19 The 2011 OHCHR Report notes that '[h]uman rights obligations and commitments have the potential to inform and strengthen international, regional and national pol icymaking in the area of environmental protection and promoting policy coherence, legitimacy and sustainable outcomes', 20 but it does not attempt to set out any new vision for the relationship between human rights and the environment. It summarizes developments in the UN treaty bodies and human rights courts, and records what the UNHCR has already done in this field. Three theoretical approaches to the relation ship between human rights and the environment are identified. 21 The first sees the environment as a 'precondition to the enjoyment of human rights'. The second views human rights as 'tools to address environmental issues, both procedurally and sub stantively'. The third integrates human rights and the environment under the concept of sustainable development. It identifies also 'the call from some quarters for the rec ognition of a human right to a healthy environment' and notes the alternative view that such a right in effect already exists. 22 The report recognizes that many forms of environmental damage are transnational in character, and that the extraterritorial application of human rights law in this context remains unsettled. It concludes that ]ncour ages all efforts towards the implementation of the principles of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, in particular principle 10, in order to contribute, inter alia, to effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy'. Implementation of Rio Principle 10 is the most significant element here because, like the Aarhus Convention, it acknowledges the importance of public par ticipation in environmental decisionmaking, access to information, and access to justice.
The Council has made the connection between human rights and climate change:
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Noting that climate changerelated impacts have a range of implications, both direct and indi rect, for the effective enjoyment of human rights including, inter alia, the right to life, the right to adequate food, the right to the highest attainable standard of health, the right to adequate housing, the right to selfdetermination and human rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation, and recalling that in no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
It is worth noting here that climate change is already regarded in international law as a 'common concern of humanity', 25 and thus as an issue in respect of which all states have legitimate concerns. The Human Rights Council is therefore right to take an interest in the matter. Nevertheless, before concluding that human rights law may provide answers to the problem of climate change, two observations in the 2009 OHCHR report are worth highlighting. First, '[w]hile climate change has obvi ous implications for the enjoyment of human rights, it is less obvious whether, and to what extent, such effects can be qualified as human rights violations in a strict legal sense'. 26 The report goes on to note how the multiplicity of causes for environmental degradation and the difficulty of relating specific effects to historic emissions in partic ular countries make attributing responsibility to any one state problematic. Secondly, 'human rights litigation is not wellsuited to promote precautionary measures based on risk assessments, unless such risks pose an imminent threat to the human rights of specific individuals. Yet, by drawing attention to the broader human rights implica tions of climate change risks, the human rights perspective, in line with the precau tionary principle, emphasizes the need to avoid unnecessary delay in taking action to contain the threat of global warming'. 27 On the view set out here, a human rights perspective on climate change essentially serves to reinforce political pressure coming 23 Ibid., at paras 64-73. 24 
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619 from the more vulnerable developing states. Its utility is rhetorical rather than juridi cal. We will return to this question later.
A final but important point is that the UNHRC has appointed special rapporteurs to report on various environmental issues. 28 A number of these independent reports have covered environmental conditions in specific countries, 29 but the most signifi cant is the longstanding appointment of a special rapporteur on the illicit movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes. The activity of the special rapporteur is confined to country visits and annual reports. The present incumbent does not paint an encouraging picture:
The Special Rapporteur remains discouraged by the lack of attention paid to the mandate. During consultations with Member States, the Special Rapporteur is often confronted with arguments that issues of toxic waste management are more appropriately discussed in envi ronmental forums than at the Human Rights Council. … He calls on the Human Rights Council to take this issue more seriously. He is discouraged by the limited number of States willing to engage in constructive dialogue with him on the mandate during the interactive sessions at the Human Rights Council.
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This report is revealing for what it says about the lack of priority given to the subject and sense that it is not really perceived as a human rights issue at all.
One possible explanation for the reluctance of UN human rights institutions to engage more directly with human rights and the environment is their longstanding project on corporate responsibility for human rights abuses. While the primary respon sibility for promoting and protecting human rights lies with the state, 31 it has long been recognized that businesses and transnational corporations have contributed to or been complicit in the violation of human rights in various ways. Developing coun tries, especially, may lack the capacity to control foreign companies extracting miner als, oil, or other natural resources in a manner that harms both the local population and the environment. Weak government, poor regulation, lax enforcement, corrup tion, or simply a tooclose relationship between business and government underlies the problem. Classic examples are Shell's impact on the environment, natural resources, health, and living standards of the Ogoni people in Nigeria, 32 or the health effects of toxic waste disposed of in Abidjan by a ship under charter to Trafigura, an oil trading company based in the EU. What should we make of this 'framework' for business and human rights when considering the current law on human rights and the environment? There is no doubt that states have a responsibility to protect human rights from environmental harm caused by business and industry. It is irrelevant that the state itself does not own or operate the plant or industry in question. As the ECtHR said in Fadeyeva, the state's responsibility in environmental cases 'may arise from a failure to regulate private industry'. 39 The state thus has a duty 'to take reasonable and appropriate measures' to secure rights under human rights conventions. 40 In Öneryildiz the ECtHR empha sized that '[t]he positive obligation to take all appropriate steps to safeguard life for the purposes of Article 2 entails above all a primary duty on the State to put in place a leg islative and administrative framework designed to provide effective deterrence against threats to the right to life'. 41 The Court held that this obligation covered the licensing, setting up, operation, security, and supervision of dangerous activities, and required all those concerned to take 'practical measures to ensure the effective protection of citizens whose lives might be endangered by the inherent risks '. 42 Nor is this view of human rights law uniquely European. The Ogoniland Case is a reminder that unregulated foreign investment which contributes little to the welfare 34 of the local population but instead harms its health, livelihood, property, and natural resources may amount to a denial of human rights for which the host government is responsible in international law. 43 As Shelton has observed, 'The result offers a blue print for merging environmental protection, economic development, and guarantees of human rights'. 44 It also shows how empowering national NGOs can provide the key to successful legal action. 45 These examples do not in any sense invalidate the UN Framework's focus on the need for business to respect human rights, but they do serve to emphasize again that failure by states to respect their human rights obligations is the core of the problem, not the periphery. Even if we endorse the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights, it is still necessary to identify the relationship between human rights obligations and environmental protection in order to determine what environmental responsibilities we expect corporations to respect.
Overall, therefore, the record of the UNHRC and OHCHR on human rights and en vironment has been somewhat understated until now: human rights courts have contributed a great deal more to the subject than interstate environmental negotiations or the specialists of the UN human rights community. It is not immediately clear why this should be so, but of course it also begs the question what more the UN could con tribute to the development of human rights approaches to environmental protection. To answer that question requires us to stand back and review the three difficult questions identified in section 1. These questions will form the subject of the rest of this article.
The Development of Procedural Rights in an Environmental Context
Not all 'environmental' rights are found in mainstream human rights treaties. Any consideration of human rights in an environmental context has to take into account the development of specifically environmental rights in other treaties, and it may be necessary to interpret and apply human rights treaties with that in mind. 46 The most obvious example is the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decisionmaking and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters adopted by the UN Economic Commission for Europe. 47 As Kofi Annan, formerly SecretaryGeneral of the UN, observed, ' Although regional in scope, the significance 43 EJIL 23 (2012), of the Aarhus Convention is global. . . [I] t is the most ambitious venture in the area of "environmental democracy" so far undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations.' 48 In his view the Convention has the 'potential to serve as a global frame work for strengthening citizens' environmental rights'. 49 Its preamble not only recalls Principle 1 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment and re cognizes that 'adequate protection of the environment is essential to human wellbeing and the enjoyment of basic human rights, including the right to life itself ', but it also asserts that 'every person has the right to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and wellbeing, and the duty, both individually and in association with others, to protect and improve the environment for the benefit of present and future generations'.
However, these broad assertions of rights are somewhat misleading. The focus of the Aarhus Convention is in reality strictly procedural in content, limited to public par ticipation in environmental decisionmaking and access to justice and information. It draws inspiration from Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which gives explicit support in mandatory language to the same cat egory of procedural rights. 50 Public participation is a central element in sustainable development, and the incorporation of Aarhusstyle procedural rights into general human rights law significantly advances this objective. 51 In this context the emphasis on procedural rights in Articles 6-8 of Aarhus can be seen as a means of legitimizing decisions about sustainable development, rather than simply an exercise in extending participatory democracy or improving environmental governance.
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Aarhus is also significant insofar as Article 9 reinforces access to justice and the obligation of public authorities to enforce existing law. Under Article 9(3) applicants entitled to participate in decisionmaking will also have the right to seek administra tive or judicial review of the legality of the resulting decision. A general failure to enforce environmental law will also violate Article 9(3). 53 Article 9(4) requires that adequate, fair, and effective remedies are provided. This reflects the decisions in Lopez Ostra and Guerra under Article 8 of the ECHR. 54 Anyone who doubts that Aarhus is a human rights treaty should bear in mind three points. First, it builds upon the longestablished human right of access to justice and 48 Ibid., 'Foreword', at p.v. 49 Ibid. 50 Principle 10 provides: 'Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to infor mation concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazard ous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decisionmaking processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making informa tion widely available. on procedural elements that serve to protect the rights to life, health, and family life. 55 Secondly, it confers rights directly on individuals and not simply on states. Unusually for an environmental treaty the most innovative features of the 'nonconfrontational, nonjudicial and consultative' procedure established under Article 15 of the Convention are that members of the public and NGOs may bring complaints before a noncompliance committee the members of which are not only independent of the parties but may be nominated by NGOs. 56 The committee has given rulings which interpret and clarify provisions of the convention and a body of case law is emerg ing. 57 In all these respects it is closer to human rights treaty monitoring bodies than to the noncompliance procedures typically found in other multilateral environmen tal agreements. 58 Kravchenko concludes that 'independence, transparency, and NGO involvement in the Convention's novel compliance mechanism represent an ambi tious effort to bring democracy and participation to the very heart of compliance itself. 59 Thirdly, the essential elements of the convention -access to information, pub lic participation in environmental decisionmaking, and access to justice -have all been incorporated into European human rights law through the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 60 In substance, the Aarhus Convention rights are also ECHR rights, enforce able in national law and through the Strasbourg Court like any other human rights. To some extent the same has happened under other human rights treaties, so the point is not simply a European one. The Aarhus Convention thus represents an important extension of environmental rights and of the corpus of human rights law. How important can best be explained by recalling the most important case, Taskin v. Turkey. 63 Turkey, it should be noted, is not a party to the Aarhus Convention. That did not stop the Strasbourg Court from read ing Aarhus rights into the ECHR in a particularly extensive form. Two points stand out. First, participation in the decisionmaking process by those likely to be affected by environmental nuisances will be essential for compliance with Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention. The Court in Taskin v. Turkey held that 'whilst Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decisionmaking process leading to measures of interference must be fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests of the individual as safeguarded by Article 8'. 64 The inter ests of those affected must on this view be taken into account and given appropri ate weight when balancing them against the benefits of economic development. 65 Secondly, Taskin also envisages an informed process. The Court held that '[w]here a State must determine complex issues of environmental and economic policy, the decisionmaking process must firstly involve appropriate investigations and studies in order to allow them to predict and evaluate in advance the effects of those activities which might damage the environment and infringe individuals' rights and to enable them to strike a fair balance between the various conflicting interests at stake'. 66 The words 'environmental impact assessment' are not used here, but in many cases an EIA will be necessary to give effect to the evaluation process envisaged by the Court. Article 6 of Aarhus also has detailed provisions on the information to be made avail able. 67 Like the Ogoniland and Maya Indigenous Community cases, Taskin thus suggests that the most important contribution existing human rights law has to offer with regard to environmental protection and sustainable development is the empowerment of individuals and groups affected by environmental problems, and for whom the oppor tunity to participate in decisions is the most useful and direct means of influencing the balance of environmental, social, and economic interests. 69 From this perspective the ICCPR and IACHR case law, which espouses participatory rights for indigenous peoples. appears simply as a particular manifestation of the broader principle. The key point is that these participatory rights represent the direction in which human rights law with regard to the environment has evolved since 1994.
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The Aarhus Convention is also important because, unlike human rights treaties, it provides for public interest activism by NGOs, 71 insofar as claimants with a 'sufficient interest' are empowered to engage in public interest litigation even when their own rights or the rights of victims of a violation are not in issue. Article 9 of Aarhus thus appears to go beyond the requirements of the ECHR. So does Article 6, which extends public participation rights to anyone having an 'interest' in the decision, including NGOs.
72 'Sufficient interest' is not defined by the Convention but, in its first ruling, the Aarhus Compliance Committee held that, '[a]lthough what constitutes a sufficient interest and impairment of a right shall be determined in accordance with national law, it must be decided "with the objective of giving the public concerned wide access to justice" within the scope of the Convention'. 73 Governments are not required to develop an actio popularis, but they must not use national law 'as an excuse for intro ducing or maintaining so strict criteria that they effectively bar all or almost all envi ronmental organizations from challenging acts or omissions that contravene national law relating to the environment'. 74 Access to such procedures 'should thus be the pre sumption, not the exception'.
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The contrast between the broader public interest approach of the Aarhus Convention and the narrower ECHR/ICCPR/AmCHR focus on the rights of victims of 69 76 This is a significant difference, with important implications for any debate about an autonomous right to a decent or satisfactory environment. Not only do environmental NGOs use access to information and lobby ing to raise awareness of environmental concerns, but research has shown that they tend to have high success rates in enforcement actions and public interest litigation. 77 Moreover, the broader approach taken by Aarhus is followed in
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The question therefore arises: should the ECtHR case law follow the public interest precedent set by Aarhus, as it has in so many other respects? 79 What purpose would public interest environmental litigation serve in a human rights context? NGOs are already entitled to protect the human rights of victims of violations, and there is no need to extend their standing for that purpose. Extending their standing in environ mental matters makes sense only if the public interest in the environment itself is to be protected -that is the point of Aarhus. Answering the question in the negative would merely affirm the existing position that human rights law does not have any thing to say about protection of the environment as such. Answering it in the affirma tive would go some way towards opening the door for a right to a decent environment. That brings us to the question of greatest substance: do we want such a right? Do we want to expand rather than simply interpret the existing corpus of international human rights law? This is not simply a matter of European concern. Rather, it poten tially affects all of the principal human rights treaties, given the way human rights courts 'work consciously to coordinate their approaches'.
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A Right to a Decent Environment?
What constitutes a decent environment is a value judgement, on which reasonable people will differ. Policy choices abound in this context: what weight should be given to natural resource exploitation over nature protection, to industrial development over air and water quality, to landuse development over conservation of forests and wetlands, to energy consumption over the risks of climate change, and so on? These choices may result in wide diversities of policy and interpretation, as different gov ernments and international organizations pursue their own priorities and make their own value judgements, moderated only to some extent by international agreements on such matters as climate change and the conservation of biological diversity. The virtue of looking at environmental protection through the impact of harmful activi ties on other human rights, such as life, private life, or property, is that it focuses atten tion on what matters most to individuals: the detriment to important, internationally protected values from uncontrolled environmental harm. This approach avoids the need to define such notions as a satisfactory or decent environment. Instead, it allows a court to balance respect for convention rights and economic development. The Strasbourg Court makes the point very cogently: 'national authorities are best placed to make decisions on environmental issues, which often have difficult social and tech nical aspects. Therefore in reaching its judgments, the Court affords the national authorities in principle a wide discretion'.
81
When I first wrote on this subject in 1996 I shared the scepticism of others towards the idea of a right to a decent environment. 82 Fundamentally it looked like an attempt to turn an essentially political question into a legal one. It would take power away from democratically accountable politicians and give it to courts or treaty bodies. Predictably, Western governments ensured that the idea was stillborn within the UN system. My own scepticism has not disappeared, but it has perhaps been tempered by an awareness of the significant value of such a right in countries whose environmen tal problems are more extreme than those affecting Western Europe. 83 Moreover, in many respects the basic elements of such a right already exist. There may therefore be some merit in revisiting the question, particularly in the context of climate change, where some vision of a decent environment has global implications.
Despite their evolutionary character, human rights treaties (with the exception of the African Convention) still do not guarantee a right to a decent or satisfactory envi ronment if that concept is understood in qualitative terms unrelated to impacts on the rights of specific humans. As the ECtHR reiterated in Kyrtatos, 'neither Article 8 nor any of the other articles of the Convention are specifically designed to provide gen eral protection of the environment as such'. 84 This case involved the illegal draining of a wetland. The European Court could find no violation of the applicants' right to private life or enjoyment of property arising out of the destruction of the area in ques tion. Although they lived nearby, the applicants' rights were not affected. They were not entitled to live in any particular environment, or to have the surrounding envi ronment indefinitely preserved. The applicants succeeded only insofar as the state's nonenforcement of a court judgment violated their Convention rights.
The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights has similarly rejected as inad missible a claim on behalf of all the citizens of Panama to protect a nature reserve 628 EJIL 23 (2012), 613-642 from development. 85 Nor does the practice of the UN Human Rights Committee differ. In a case about genetically modified crops it held that 'no person may, in theoretical terms and by actio popularis, object to a law or practice which he holds to be at vari ance with the Covenant'. 86 None of these cases lends support to any conception of a freestanding individual right to a decent environment.
Should we then go the whole way and create a right to a decent environment in international human rights law? There are obvious problems of definition and anthropocentricity, well rehearsed in the literature. 87 But there are also deeper issues of legal architecture to be resolved. At the substantive level a decent or satisfactory environment should not be confused with the procedural innovations of the Aarhus Convention, or with the case law on the right to life, health, or private life. To do so would make it little more than a portmanteau for the greening of existing civil and political rights. The ample jurisprudence shows clearly that this is unnecessary and misconceived. 88 To be meaningful, a right to a decent environment has to address the environment as a public good, in which form it bears little resemblance to the accepted catalogue of civil and political rights, a catalogue which for good reasons there is great reluctance to expand.
89 A right to a decent environment is best envisaged, not as a civil and political right, but within the context of economic and social rights, where to some extent it already finds expression through the right to water, food, and envi ronmental hygiene.
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has adopted vari ous General Comments relevant to the environment and sustainable development, notably General Comments 14 and 15, which interpret Articles 11 and 12 of the ICESCR to include access to sufficient, safe, and affordable water for domestic uses and sanitation. 90 They also cover the prevention and reduction of exposure to harm ful substances including radiation and chemicals, or other detrimental environmental conditions that directly or indirectly impact upon human health. These are useful and important interpretations that have also had some impact on related areas of inter national law, including Article 10 of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, which gives priority to 'vital human needs' when allocating scarce water resources. 91 view, existing economic and social rights help to guarantee some of the indispensable attributes of a decent environment. What more would the explicit recognition of a right to a decent environment add?
Arguably, it would add what is currently lacking from the corpus of UN economic and social rights, namely a broader and more explicit focus on environmental qual ity which could be balanced directly against the covenant's economic and develop mental priorities. Article 1 of the ICESCR reiterates the right of peoples 'freely [to] pursue their economic, social and cultural development' and 'freely [to] dispose of their natural wealth and resources', but other than to 'the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene' (Article 12), the Covenant makes no specific reference to protection of the environment. Despite the efforts of the treaty organs to invest the Covenant with greater environmental relevance, it still falls short of giving a decent environment recognition as a significant public interest. Lacking the status of a right means that the environment can be trumped by those values which have that status, including economic development and natural resource exploitation.
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This is an omission which needs to be addressed if the environment as a public good is to receive the weight it deserves in the balance of economic, social, and cultural rights. That could be one way of using human rights law to address the impact of the greenhouse gas emitting activities which are causing climate change and adversely affecting the global environment.
The key question therefore is what values we think a covenant on economic and social rights should recognize in the modern world. Is the environment -or the global environment -a sufficiently important public good to merit economic and social rights status comparable to economic development? The answer endorsed repeatedly by the UN over the past 40 years is obviously yes: at Stockholm in 1972, at Rio in 1992, and at Johannesburg in 2002, the consensus of states has favoured sustainable development as the leading concept of international environmental policy. Although 'sustainable development' is used throughout the Rio Declaration, it was not until the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development that anything approaching a defini tion of the concept could be attempted by the UN. Three 'interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development' were identified in the Johannesburg Declaration -economic development, social development, and environmental pro tection. 93 This seems tailormade for a reformulation of the rights guaranteed in the ICESCR.
The challenge posed by sustainable development is to ensure that environmental protection is fully integrated into economic policy. Acknowledging that the environ ment is part of this equation, the 1992 Rio Declaration (Principle 3) and the 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human Rights (paragraph11) both emphasize that '[t]he right to development should be fulfilled so as to meet equitably the developmental and envi ronmental needs of present and future generations'. The ICJ has repeatedly referred EJIL 23 (2012), to 'the need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment [which] is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development'. 94 In the Pulp Mills Case the Court again noted the 'interconnectedness between equitable and rea sonable utilization of a shared resource and the balance between economic develop ment and environmental protection that is the essence of sustainable development'. 95 The essential point of these examples is that, while recognizing that the right to pursue economic development is an attribute of a state's sovereignty over its own natural resources and territory, it cannot lawfully be exercised without regard for the detri mental impact on the environment or on human rights. In Pulp Mills the Court's very limited focus was on whether Uruguay had complied with its international obligations when deciding to build the plant, and its references to integrating economic develop ment and environmental protection have to be seen in that context. It did not attempt to decide whether a policy of building pulp mills was sustainable development in any other sense. In effect, the process of decisionmaking and compliance with environ mental and human rights obligations, rather than the nature of the development itself, constitute the key legal tests of sustainable development in current interna tional law. 96 If the ICJ can handle questions of this kind then it might be said that it should not be beyond the capability of human rights courts also to do so. In a sense they already have: Hatton, 97 the case concerning night flights at Heathrow airport, is selfevidently a case about sustainable development as understood by the ICJ, albeit one in which the terms of the discussion are limited to balancing the direct impact on the health and family life of the applicants against the benefits to the community at large. Various decisions of the InterAmerican Commission of Human Rights 98 and the UN Human Rights Committee 99 in cases concerning logging, oil extraction, and mining on land belonging to indigenous peoples can be viewed from the same perspective. The African Commission's decision in Ogoniland is by far the most important case to address the public interest in protecting the environment as such, 100 but it does so in a setting where environmental destruction had caused serious harm to the affected communities.
The decision in Ogoniland can be seen as a challenge to the sustainability of oil extrac tion in that part of Nigeria. Given the degree of environmental harm and a lack of material benefits for the Ogoni people, it is not surprising that the African Commission does not see this case simply as a failure to maintain a fair balance between public good and private rights. The decision gives some indication of how a right to a decent or satisfactory environment could be used, but its exceptional basis in Articles 21 and 24 of the African Convention has to be recalled. It is unique in adjudicating for the first time on the right of peoples to dispose freely of their own natural resources and in ordering extensive environmental cleanup measures to be taken. 101 Moreover, the rights created by the African Convention are peoples' rights, not individual rights, so the recognition of a public interest in environmental protection and sustainable devel opment is less of an innovation. The African Convention is the only regional human rights treaty to combine economic, social, civil, and political rights and make them all justiciable before an international court.
Clearly there can be different views on what constitutes a fair balance between economic interests and individual or group rights in such cases, and any judgment is inevitably subjective. Moreover, neither environmental protection nor human rights necessarily trumps the right to economic development. In Hatton, the Grand Chamber's approach affords considerably greater deference towards government eco nomic policy than at first instance, and leaves little room for the Court to substitute its own view of the extent to which the environment should be protected from develop ment:
102 ' [a]t the same time, the Court reiterates the fundamentally subsidiary role of the Convention. The national authorities have direct democratic legitimation and are, as the Court has held on many occasions, in principle better placed than an interna tional court to evaluate local needs and conditions.' 103 On this basis, decisions about where the public interest lies are mainly for politicians, not for courts, save in the most extreme cases where judicial review is easy to justify. That conclusion is not inconsist ent with the Ogoniland Case, where the problems were undoubtedly of a more extreme kind. But Ogoniland shows that the right to a decent environment can be useful at the extremes, 104 which is why the debate becomes relevant to climate change. Any comparison between Hatton and the Ogoniland Case will inevitably point to the more conservative approach of European law. But would we want other human rights courts deciding where the appropriate balance between economic and environ mental objectives should lie? Should we let judges determine whether to allow the construction of coalfired power stations instead of extending schemes for generating EJIL 23 (2012), 613-642 renewable energy? Hatton may suggest that, except at the extremes, human rights courts are not usually the best bodies to perform this balancing task, rather than national or international political institutions. Even if European human rights law did endorse the right to a decent environment, in whatever form, it seems unlikely that the outcome of Hatton would differ. On any view the balance would in principle be for governments to determine, and on the facts of that case any court or tribunal would probably have upheld the government's approach. This does not provide a good basis for tackling government policy on climate change from a human rights perspective.
As I have argued elsewhere, 105 the distinction between Hatton and Taskin is import ant in this context. Hatton shows understandable reluctance to allow the European Court of Human Rights to become a forum for appeals against the policy judgements of governments, provided they do not disproportionately affect individual rights. Taskin shows greater willingness to insist that decisions made by public authorities follow proper procedures involving adequate information, public participation, and access to judicial review. This remains a tenable and democratically defensible distinc tion. One would expect most judges of the European Court of Human Rights to be comfortable with it.
However, if we do take the view that judges are not the right people to decide what constitutes a decent or satisfactory environment, is there then no role for international human rights law in this debate? The obvious alternative would be to follow the logic of the ICESCR and revert to the UN human rights institutions and treaty bodies and allow them, rather than courts, to oversee the expansion of the corpus of economic and social rights to include a right to a decent environment. That would give the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights a man date to review the scope of the Covenant in relation to the environment. 106 It would allow the balance between environmental protection and economic development to be argued in an intergovernmental forum, through a 'constructive dialogue' with states parties. Although the current UN monitoring process has 'builtin defects', including poor reporting and excessive deference to states, 107 two additional mech anisms now exist through which compliance can be scrutinized. First, as we noted earlier, the High Commissioner for Human Rights has power to appoint special rapporteurs to report on environmental conditions in individual countries or on specific topics. 108 Secondly, in 2009 an optional protocol for individual complaints under the Covenant was opened for signature. 109 Sceptics often question the value of all these monitoring processes, but if they do have value then the environment should be a larger part of the process.
Potentially, therefore, the ICESCR model could provide a mechanism for balanc ing environmental claims against competing economic objectives if the Covenant were to be amended in appropriate terms. While this would not expand the role of courts, it would expand the corpus of human rights law in a manner that fits comfort ably into the existing system. It would modernize the Covenant, while also giving it greater coherence and consistency with contemporary international environmental law and policy. In that form it could give human rights law and the UN Committee on Economic and Social Rights something to contribute to the global challenge of climate change, and might help to counteract the evident inaction of states revealed by the Copenhagen and Cancun negotiations. It is this conclusion which most force fully undermines the argument that a right to a decent environment is redundant and that general international environmental law is better placed to regulate global envi ronmental problems. 110 What may have been persuasive in 1996 now looks increas ingly threadbare, given the unimpressive record of too many states parties to the UN Convention on Climate Change.
111 Unrestrained carbon emissions are not a recipe for a decent environment of any kind.
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Incorporating a right to a decent environment in the ICESCR will not save the global climate by itself, but it may add to political pressure on governments to move further and faster towards goals already enshrined in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and in the commitments undertaken at Cancun in 2011. In common with the UNFCCC, this kind of human rights approach to climate change would recognize that the only viable perspective is a global one, focused not on the rights of individuals, or peoples, or states, but of humanity as whole. It would reconceptualize in the language of economic and social rights the idea of the environment as a common good or common concern of humanity. 114 or in global regulatory agreements such as the UNFCCC, with its associated protocols, nonbinding accords, and decisions of the parties. 115 On this view the problem is properly addressed by international law at an interstate level, not at the level of human rights law. However, a more nuanced approach to such arguments is evident in the case law, and it is far from clear that the lex specialis principle operates in this way. 116 A mutually exclusive relationship between human rights law and general international law on transboundary and global environmental protection is consistent neither with the evolution of international environmental law as a whole nor with contemporary developments in international human rights law.
First, it harks back to the classical era when humans, whether at home or abroad, were still viewed as objects of international law, not as subjects meriting their own rights. It is unnecessary here to recall this debate, save only to remember that even today only governments can bring claims against another state for violations of gen eral international law. 117 If human rights law has no application to environmen tally harmful activities in one state that directly impact on humans in other states, then whatever right they may have to be protected from transboundary harm will be exercisable only by the state acting on their behalf. But, regardless of legal theory, realworld problems of pollution and the unsustainable use of renewable resources that are the core of most environmental problems do not suddenly stop at national borders, nor do they have any less impact on those who live beyond the border. Some of these problems may indeed be only transboundary in scale, like localized air pol lution, affecting only two or three states or a particular region. But the climate sys tem, forests and terrestrial ecosystems, and the marine environment are inevitably shared elements of a global ecological system -a fact recognized by the development of global environmental agreements and the evolution of concepts such as the sus tainable use of natural resources, intergenerational equity, and common concern of humankind. 118 In the terminology of the law of state responsibility, much of the law relating to these global environmental problems -like climate change -falls squarely into the category of obligations owed to the international community as a whole. 119 So, of course, does international human rights law. 120 Secondly, one significant trend of international environmental policy over the past 30 years, pursued initially in isolation from international human rights law but now in essence derived from it, has been the attempt to ensure nondiscriminatory treatment, including access to justice and effective remedies, for those individuals or communities who are directly affected by transboundary pollution and environmen tal problems. 121 If nuisances do not stop at borders it makes little sense to treat the victims differently depending on where they happen to live. Making national rem edies available to transboundary victims in these circumstances is consistent with the view that there are significant advantages in avoiding resort to interstate remedies for the resolution of transboundary environmental disputes wherever possible. 122 In this broader sense, transboundary claimants can be empowered to act as part of the enforcement structure of international environmental law by giving them access to the same information, decisionmaking processes, and legal procedures as nation als. The Aarhus Convention represents one element of this development, an element now firmly established within the pantheon of human rights law by the ECHR. 123 This development shows how victims of transboundary pollution already have rights in international law which they can exercise within the legal system of the polluting state; what remains uncertain is whether they also have human rights exercisable against the polluting state.
How far a state must respect the human rights of persons in other countries thus becomes an important question once we start to ask whether we can view climate change and transboundary pollution in human rights terms. That is the debate initi ated by the UNHRC's characterization of climate change as a human rights issue. 124 It is also posed by the Aerial Spraying Case, initiated by Ecuador in 2007 following alleged crossborder spraying of herbicides by Colombian aircraft during antinarcotic operations. 125 Ecuador argued, inter alia, that the resulting pollution violated the but it has nevertheless been applied in cases involving foreign arrests, military opera tions abroad, and occupation of foreign territory.
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The ratio of these and other similar cases is that where a state exercises control over territory or persons abroad, human rights obligations will follow. As the IACHR explained in a case involving the shooting down of civilian aircraft over the high seas:
In fact, the Commission would point out that, in certain cases, the exercise of its jurisdiction over extraterritorial events is not only consistent with but required by the applicable rules. The essential rights of the individual are proclaimed in the Americas on the basis of equality and nondiscrimination, 'without distinction as to race, nationality, creed, or sex.' Because individ ual rights are inherent to the human being, all the American states are obligated to respect the protected rights of any person subject to their jurisdiction. Although this usually refers to persons who are within the territory of a state, in certain instances it can refer to extrater ritorial actions, when the person is present in the territory of a state but subject to the control of another state, generally through the actions of that state's agents abroad. In principle, the investigation refers not to the nationality of the alleged victim or his presence in a particular geographic area, but to whether, in those specific circumstances, the state observed the rights of a person subject to its authority and control.
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In Al-Skeini the European Court reiterated that '[t]he Court does not consider that juris diction in the above cases arose solely from the control exercised by the Contracting State over the buildings, aircraft or ship in which the individuals were held. What is decisive in such cases is the exercise of physical power and control over the person in question.'
136 It held the Convention applicable to deaths caused by the British Army during its occupation of Iraq.
None of these cases is environmental, but they give a good indication of the way international courts have approached the extraterritorial application of all the main human rights treaties. We also know from the human rights case law reviewed ear lier in this article that a failure by the state to regulate or control environmental nui sances within its own territory may interfere with human rights. 137 How then should we answer the question whether the obligation to protect human rights from such environmental nuisances also applies extraterritorially? Can we conclude that the transboundary victims of nuisances with extraterritorial effects are within the 'juris diction' of the respondent state when the enjoyment of their human rights is affected? There are no precedents directly in point, but a good case can nevertheless be made for the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties to environmental nuisances. Given the failure of much of the literature to deal with this question in any depth (or even to ask it), it is worth doing so here.
EJIL 23 (2012), First, the human rights case law is not consistent in its treatment of extraterritorial harm. At one extreme, the UN Human Rights Committee observed in Delia Saldias de López v. Uruguay, 'It would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory.'
138 On this view any harmful effect on human rights anywhere is potentially within the 'jurisdiction' of the respondent state, insofar as courts have emphasized authority or control over the person rather than simply focusing on con trol of territory. 139 Nevertheless, that view was rejected in Bankovic, where the ECHR held that '[t]he Court considers that the applicants' submission is tantamount to arguing that anyone adversely affected by an act imputable to a Contracting State, wherever in the world that act may have been committed or its consequences felt, is thereby brought within the jurisdiction of that State for the purpose of Article 1 of the Convention. ... The Court is inclined to agree with the Governments' submission that the text of Article 1 does not accommodate such an approach to "jurisdiction".' 140 However, Bankovic has not been followed in later cases, 141 nor is it supported by case law under other human rights treaties, 142 and it appears to be a decision particular to its own unusual circumstances. 143 Moreover, it is far removed on its facts from trans boundary pollution cases.
Secondly, while it is less plausible to say that the polluting state 'controls' the terri tory of the state affected by pollution, 144 it is entirely plausible to conclude that the vic tims of transboundary pollution fall within the 'jurisdiction' of the polluting state -in the most straightforward sense of legal jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of national courts to hear cases involving transboundary harm to extraterritorial plaintiffs is recognized in private international law and in environmental liability conventions. 145 As we noted at the beginning of this section, in such cases the Aarhus Convention and ear lier OECD practice require the polluting state to make provision for nondiscriminatory access to justice in its own legal system. Aarhus applies in general terms to the 'the public' or 'the public concerned', without distinguishing between those inside the state and others beyond its borders. 146 Article 3(9), the nondiscrimination Article, requires that 'the public shall have access to information, have the possibility to par ticipate in decisionmaking and have access to justice in environmental matters with out discrimination as to citizenship, nationality or domicile and, in the case of a legal person, without discrimination as to where it has its registered seat or an effective centre of its activities.' The principle of nondiscrimination has also been adopted by the International Law Commission in its articles on transboundary harm, 147 by the UNECE in its environmental conventions, 148 and by MERCOSUR. 149 The IACtHR has held that 'the fundamental principle of equality and nondiscrimination constitute a part of general international law'. 150 There is little point in requiring that national remedies be made available to transboundary claimants if they cannot also resort to international or regional human rights law when necessary to compel the polluting state to enforce its own court orders or laws or to assess and take adequate account of the harmful effects of activities which it authorizes and regulates. That is exactly how domestic claimants have successfully used human rights law in environmental cases. 151 Moreover, where it is possible to take effective measures to prevent or mitigate transboundary harm to human rights then the argument that the state has no obli gation to do so merely because the harm is extraterritorial is not a compelling one. On the contrary, the nondiscrimination principle requires the polluting state to treat emissions are foreseeably making matters worse? Or those states like the US or Canada which have opted out of Kyoto and failed to take adequate measures to limit further emissions so as to stabilize global temperatures at 1990 levels? Or the governments of the Association of Small Island States, which may have conceded far too much when ratifying the Kyoto Protocol or in subsequent climate negotiations? It is much harder to frame such a problem in terms of jurisdiction or control over persons or ter ritory as required by the human rights case law. It is also harder to contend that any of these governments have failed to strike the right balance between their own state's economic development and the right to life or private life in other states when they have either complied with or are exempt from greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets established by Kyoto and agreed by the international community as a whole.
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Inadequately controlled transboundary pollution is clearly a breach of general inter national law, 157 and as I have argued here may also be a breach of human rights law. However, given the terms of the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent voluntary agreements it is far from clear that inadequately controlled climate change violates any treaty obli gations or general international law. 158 In those circumstances the argument that it nevertheless violates existing human rights law is far harder to make.
At this point it may be better to accept, as the UNHRC appears to have done, that existing human rights law is not the right medium for addressing the shared problem of climate change and that further negotiations through the UNFCCC process are the only realistic answer, however unsatisfactory that might be. If it wants to take cli mate change seriously then it must find a better way of giving human rights concerns greater weight within the UNFCCC negotiating process, and, as we saw in the previous section, that can best be achieved by using the ICESCR and the notion of a right to a decent environment to pressurize governments.
Conclusions
Articulating a right to a decent or healthy environment within the context of eco nomic, social, and cultural rights is not inherently problematic. Clarifying the exis tence of such a right would entail giving greater weight to the global public interest in protecting the environment and promoting sustainable development, but this could be achieved without doing damage to the fabric of human rights law, and in a manner which fully respects the wide margin of appreciation that states are entitled to exercise when balancing economic, environmental, and social policy objectives. It would build on existing precedents under the ICESCR, and reflect international policy on sustain able development endorsed at Rio in 1992 and in subsequent international confer ences. The further elaboration of procedural rights, based on the Aarhus Convention, 156 Greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets under Kyoto apply only to Annex I developed state parties, not to developing countries, including China, India, and Brazil. Compare 1997 Kyoto Protocol, Arts 2-9, which apply to annex I parties, and Art. 10, which applies to all parties.
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EJIL 23 (2012), would facilitate the implementation of such a right, and give greater prominence globally to the role of NGOs in public interest litigation and advocacy. These two devel opments go hand in hand. They are not a necessary part of any declaration or proto col on human rights and the environment, but they do represent a logical extension of existing policies and would represent a real exercise in progressive development of the law. A declaration or protocol on human rights and the environment thus makes sense provided it brings together existing civil, political, economic, and social rights in one coherent whole, while at the same time reconceptualizing in the language of economic and social rights the idea of the environment as a common good. It would, in other words, recognize the global environment as a public interest that states have a responsibility to protect, even if they only implement that responsibility progressively and insofar as resources allow. Using existing human rights law to grapple with climate change is more challeng ing. Giving human rights extraterritorial scope in environmental cases is not the prob lematic issue, however. As we have seen, the argument that transboundary victims come within the jurisdiction or control of the polluting state can be made, is con sistent with existing human rights law, and is supported by developments in inter national environmental law. If that is correct then a state does have to take account of transboundary environmental impacts on human rights and it is obliged to facili tate access to remedies and other procedures. But climate change is a global problem. It cannot easily be addressed by the simple process of giving existing human rights law transboundary effect. It affects many states and much of humanity. Its causes, and those responsible, are too numerous and too widely spread to respond usefully to individual human rights claims. Moreover, much of the economic policy which drives greenhouse gas emissions worldwide is presently lawful and consistent with the terms of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. It is no more likely to be derailed by human rights litigation based on ICCPR rights than the UK's policy on Heathrow airport in the Hatton Case. The response of human rights law -if it is to have one -needs to be in global terms, treating the global environment and climate as the common concern of humanity. That is why locating the right to a decent environment within the corpus and institutional structures of economic, social, and cultural rights makes more sense. In that context the policies of individual states on energy use, reduction of green house gas emissions, land use, and deforestation could be scrutinized and balanced against the evidence of their global impact on human rights and the environment. This is not a panacea for deadlock in the UNFCCC negotiations, but it would give the rights of humanity as a whole a voice that at present is scarcely heard. Whether the UNHRC wishes to travel down this road is another question, for politicians to answer rather than lawyers, but that is where it must go if it wishes to do more than posture on climate change.
